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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Blytheville, Arkansas, a Bible belt community in a Right-to-Work state, is an unlikely site for a 
major labor dispute. But for almost a decade, it has witnessed a bitter struggle between an auto supply 
company and a small UAW local. UAW 1249's fight to win a contract is significant because of its 
persistence and because of the innovative tactics it has employed. 
Emphasizing the relationship between product quality and job security, UAW Local 1249 mounted an 
internal organizing campaign that focused on the company's long-standing indifference to quality control. 
This campaign could serve as a model for other local unions looking for ways to fight mismanagement. 
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* Mike Matuszak 
Blytheville, Arkansas, a Bible belt community in a Right-to-Work 
state, is an unlikely site for a major labor dispute. But for almost 
a decade, it has witnessed a bitter struggle between an auto supply 
company and a small UAW local. UAW 1249's fight to win a 
contract is significant because of its persistence and because of 
the innovative tactics it has employed. 
Emphasizing the relationship between product quality and job 
security, UAW Local 1249 mounted an internal organizing 
campaign that focused on the company's long-standing 
indifference to quality control. This campaign could serve as a 
model for other local unions looking for ways to fight mis-
management. 
UAW 1249 represents about 300 workers at the Randall 
Company (a division of Textron) in Blytheville. The plant produces 
hub caps, trim and other automotive parts for assembly plants 
throughout North America. UAW members there have worked 
without a contract since 1977, when management broke a strike 
by hiring replacements and then engineered an unsuccessful 
decertification election. Since that time Randall has continued its 
• Mike Matuszak teaches in the Labor Education Program at the University of 
Arkansas at Little Rock. 
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union-busting campaign, for which it has been cited for numerous 
labor law violations and ordered to pay $280,000 in fines and 
backpay. The company refused to bargain until a 1984 court 
decision forced it to return to the table. 
In early 1984, with the help of then UAW Region 5 Assistant 
Director Jerry Tbcker, the local began to mount a campaign to 
build union membership with the ultimate goal of winning a 
collective bargaining agreement. At that time it had fewer than 
20 dues-paying members. The company had not honored the dues 
check-off clause since the 1977 strike, and hand-collecting was 
hampered by Randall's policy of disciplining union activists. Wages 
averaged only $5-an-hour. 
Despite the low wages, the union leadership did not make 
economics its main organizing issue because the company had 
successfully linked higher wages to the threat of a plant closing. 
Instead, it focused on three basic issues: the general benefit of 
working with a union contract, health and safety, and product 
quality. 
The local leadership felt a campaign focused on Randall's 
cavalier attitude toward product quality would appeal to the 
workforce. Rumors that the plant was in danger of closing had 
been circulating for some time, and union leaders feared that 
Randall's lack of commitment to quality would turn rumor into 
reality. Aware that auto manufacturers were reducing the number 
of suppliers and emphasizing quality as a decisive factor in the 
placement of future orders, the union argued that job security 
depended on product quality and on cooperation between labor 
and management. Real cooperation, it argued, was not possible 
without the protections provided by a union contract. 
Realizing that management was unwilling to assume respon-
sibility for quality, the union had to develop a means to verify 
union and employee commitment to quality. The local leadership 
formed a union "quality audit team," handpicking workers from 
throughout the plant who could be trusted. Trust was essential 
at this early stage because management had previously infiltrated 
union meetings. 
Meeting at least once a week for two months before it was fully 
organized, the initial audit team was made up of 30 workers (a 
full 10% of the workforce), with representation from each shift 
in all key areas of the plant. Once organized, these workers began 
wearing UAW caps and T-shirts with the slogan "Safety, Quality, 
Union Rights." 
The team's first task was to identify all products and customers, 
including a description of each part the plant produced, a part 
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Charlotte Consiglio from UAW Local 317 at Bell Helicopter in Fort 
Worth, Texas, at informational picket at Randall's Arkansas plant. Both 
Randall and Bell are divisions of Textron, and through an ESOP Local 
317 members are Textron stockholders. 
identification number and the number of parts shipped to specific 
customers per week. Having organized this complex research task, 
the union was ready to mount its campaign. 
In a March 1984 negotiating session, the union proposed a "Joint 
Commitment to Quality" provision that called for the establish-
ment of a union-management committee to work out inspection 
standards and discuss quality problems on a monthly basis. 
Randall rejected the proposal outright and maintained there were 
no quality problems at the plant. The union then informed 
management that it had formed its own quality audit teams to 
gather information about instances where management ignores 
quality principles. 
Anticipating retaliation by Randall, the union set up a Solidarity 
Fund to provide financial assistance to members who were 
disciplined. Besides soliciting weekly in-plant contributions, the 
local made an appeal to other Region 5 UAW locals that produced 
more than $16,000. 
A procedure was developed for monitoring product quality. 
When defective parts were run, audit team members were 
instructed to bring substandard products to the attention of 
management. Only when the company took no action were 
members to record the incident. The local devised a code of 39 
possible defects so that the particular quality problem could be 
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recorded. At the end of each shift, slips of paper with the 
information were submitted to the person keeping a master record. 
As this information was systematically gathered, the union was 
shocked at the magnitude of the quality problem. The job proved 
too big for one person, and a code sheet was then devised for each 
audit team member. The sheet, which was tallied off company 
property, allowed the auditor to quickly record the model, part 
number, description, quantity, date and defect at the end of each 
shift. 
The union informed the company that it was keeping quality 
records and had found a major quality problem at the plant. The 
union indicated that if there was no movement by the company 
to improve quality, the forms would be shown to Ford and General 
Motors. The company never asked to see the records and claimed 
that Ford and GM didn't care if the parts they were buying came 
from a UAW plant or not. 
During UAW-GM negotiations in the summer of 1984, the UAW 
proposed a supplier stability clause, enabling the union to bring 
to GM's attention any quality or labor relations problems at parts 
supply plants. When GM claimed that existing quality control 
procedures were adequate, the UAW produced a stack of materials 
from the quality audit team at Randall. After verifying the 
accuracy of the reports, GM agreed to a letter of understanding 
on the parts supplier proposal. 
In July 1984 Randall called employees together in small group 
meetings and informed them that the company had received more 
than 700 quality complaints from various customers. The company 
announced the installation of suggestion boxes to address the 
problem and threatened that if improvements were not 
forthcoming, the plant would be forced to close. 
These developments fueled the resolve of union members. The 
campaign reached a fever pitch in early October when UAW 
members from Bell Helicopter (also a subsidiary of Textron) in 
Forth Worth, Texas, travelled more than 500 miles to conduct an 
informational picket at the Randall plant. Through an employee 
stock ownership plan, the Bell workers are Textron shareholders, 
and in that capacity they protested the mismanagement at Randall. 
Richard Price, Randall Division President, personally responded 
to the union campaign. In small group meetings with employees 
in late November, he blamed the plant's quality problems on 
worker sabotage. Price implied that the union was responsible and 
urged workers to identify the culprits and call a "crime stoppers" 
hotline. He also declared negotiations at impasse and announced 
an immediate 40-cent-an-hour raise and scheduled raises of 40 
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cents for each of the next two years. 
Randall workers, who hadn't had a raise in four years, regarded 
this as a union victory. In late 1984, 85% of the workers had signed 
union cards and more than 100 were regularly paying dues. 
Randall's quality problems continued and discussions were held 
between the company and Ford and GM. Randall requested copies 
of the documents the UAW had provided GM, and when provided, 
the company used handwriting experts to identify the author. A 
union officer was subsequently discharged for allegedly supplying 
information to Randall customers detailing defective parts 
shipments. The officer has filed a wrongful discharge suit and the 
company has filed a countersuit seeking $42 million in damages. 
While the quality campaign did not bring a complete victory, 
it did succeed in mobilizing the workers and inducing a wage 
increase, and members are hopeful that the resolution of the 
lawsuits will result in a contract settlement. 
UAW 1249's experience shows the potential of local union 
campaigns around product quality and other problems generated 
by mismanagement. The union's work in Blytheville also 
establishes some initial guidelines for a quality campaign, which 
we might sum up as follows: 
• Before considering a quality campaign, talk with your union's 
legal counsel. 
• A quality campaign is a grass-roots program and can't be 
rushed into. Members of the quality audit team must trust each 
other and be willing to assume the risk and sacrifice involved. 
Solidarity Funds should be established to diminish the intimidation 
value of disciplines. 
• Sophisticated record-keeping capabilities must be developed, 
as a systematic method of recording and analyzing information 
can make or break a campaign. 
• The local must have a plan for utilizing the information once 
it is compiled. The information itself is useless if you don't know 
what to do with it. 
• Paperwork should be processed away from the worksite, 
making it more difficult for the company to single out and 
discipline one person in order to destroy the campaign. As much 
as possible, communications about the campaign should be verbal 
and in-person. • 
